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Law as Engineering is a provocative and stimulating book that asserts that lawyers are 
designers, and further that the type of designers that they are most closely aligned with are 
engineers.  
The book starts with a lively account of earlier explorations of law and lawyers as social and 
legal engineers. The tradition most prominent in this account is the legal realist tradition, and 
the most prominent writer is Karl Llewellyn. Lon Fuller is also given respectful attention. 
One demarcation made in the introduction that is important for the book is the distinction 
between policy and law. The engineering of interest to Howarth is centred in legal drafting, 
of statutes and contracts, not in legal policy and grand schemes of social engineering. The 
autonomy of the law, both as a practice and as an academic subject, is tied up with this 
distinction between policy which is political and legal craft which is legal proper.  The other 
task of the introduction is to suggest that our paradigm of the lawyer is wrong. Most lawyers 
are not concerned with litigation: the paradigm should not be lawyers as dispute specialists 
but lawyers as creators of legal devices such as statutes, companies, contracts and property 
interests. With this more realistic paradigm in place it is then possible to see more clearly the 
similarities with engineers who make devices. 
Howarth locates his work alongside or as part of the self-proclaimed “new legal realists” 
movement.1 However, it seems congruent with many other contemporary approaches to 
ethical theory, legal theory, law, legal practice, and legal education. Consider the following 
attacks on the primacy of theory over practice:   
Howarth on the relationship between science and engineering:2 
“Engineers are not even ‘applied’ scientists, in the sense of those who merely take 
advances in theoretical knowledge and apply them to practical problems … it is 
mistake to believe that the intellectual movement is always from science to 
engineering. The contrary movement is also important … many engineers claim 
that engineering is not merely applied science because it generates its own forms 
of knowledge … that engineering knowledge is not just ‘know-how’, a set of 
unspoken practices, but knowledge that can be stated clearly, tested and 
transmitted.” 
                                                          
1 David Howarth, Law as Engineering (2013) Edwin Elgar Cheltenham at p. 167 citing Howard Erlanger, Bryant 
Garth, Jane Larson, Elizabeth Mertz, Victoria Nourse and David Wilkins, Is it Time for a New Legal Realism? 
[2005] Wisconsin Law Review 335. The revival of legal realism, which was inspired at least in part by American 
pragmatism, finds a parallel in philosophy with Cheryl Misak (ed), New Pragmatists (2007) Clarendon Press, 
Oxford. 
2 David Howarth, Law as Engineering (2013) Edwin Elgar Cheltenham at pp. 54-55. 
Howarth on his vision for legal research:3 
“Academic engineers study how practicing engineers create new useful objects. 
Their objective is to take engineers’ implicit, unspoken ‘know-how’ and to turn it 
into explicit knowledge …They systemise what engineers do and make it explicit, 
but they also study the existing processes’ successes and failures … so they can 
suggest improvements … There is a template here for legal research.” 
Carnegie report on the primacy of practice:4 
 “Formal knowledge is not the source of expert practice. The reverse is true: 
expert practice is the source of formal knowledge about practice. Once enacted, 
skilled performance can be turned into a set of rules and procedures for 
pedagogical use, as in the cognitive apprenticeship. But the opposite is not 
possible: the progression from competence to expertise cannot be described as 
simple a step-by-step build-up of the lower functions. In the world of practice, 
holism is real and prior to analysis. Theory can – and must – learn from practice.” 
MacKinnon on the split between high status theory and low status clinical practice in legal 
education: 5 
“The theory/practice split inherited from male dominance has not served women 
conceptually or practically. I doubt it serves legal education either.” 
Toulmin on the proper role and use of ethical theory as subordinate to moral practice, 
rejecting the ideas that theory is foundational for practice or the source of principles that are 
then somehow simply ‘applied’ in specific cases:6 
“This brings into focus the relation of Ethical Theory to Moral Practice, which 
comes onto center stage at this point: the central issue is not the timeless question, 
‘What general principles can be relied on to decide this case, in terms that are 
binding on everyone who considers it?’ but rather the more timely question, 
‘Whose interests can be accepted as morally overriding in the situation that faces 
us here and now?’” 
“Theory (so to speak) is not a foundation on which we can safely construct 
Practice; rather it is a way of bringing our external commitments into line with 
our experience as practitioners.” 
Ferris and Johnson on the purposes of legal education:7 
                                                          
3 Ibid. at p. 158. 
4 William M. Sullivan, Anne Colby, Judith Welch, Lloyd Bond and Lee S. Shulman, Educating Lawyers: 
preparation for the Profession of Law (2007) Jossey-Bass: San Francisco, CA at 118. 
5 Catharine A. MacKinnon, Mainstreaming Feminism in Legal Education (2003) 53 J. Legal Educ. 199 at p. 211 
citing: Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral: The Ethics of Feminism and Clinical Education (1991) 
75 Minn. L. Rev. 1599. 
6 Stephen Toulmin, Return to Reason (2003) Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA at  loc 1629-32 and loc 
1762-63 
“There has been an implicit assumption that legal education should be about 
exposition and evaluation, and should reward facility in exposition and theoretical 
awareness. This theoretically based assumption generates a theory-induced 
blindness … The role of lawyer as rule entrepreneur is lost sight of. One 
alternative assumption about legal education would be that law is a game like 
activity; and legal education should be directed towards promoting those qualities 
that would enhance performance in this game … We argue for a clearer 
awareness of the role of rule entrepreneurship in clinical programmes and in legal 
education generally.” 
Finally, pre-dating these twenty-first century attempts to subordinate theory to practice is 
Bernard Williams on theory (bad) critical reflection (good) and life (the point of it all):8 
“Theory looks characteristically for considerations that are very general and have 
as little distinctive content as possible, because it is trying to systemize and 
because it wants to represent as many reasons as possible as applications of other 
reasons. But critical reflection should seek for as much shared understanding as it 
can find on any issue, and use any ethical material that, in the context of the 
reflective discussion, makes some sense and commands some loyalty. Of course 
that will take things for granted, but as serious reflection it must know it will do 
that. The only serious enterprise is living, and we have to live after the reflection; 
moreover (though the distinction of theory and practice encourages us to forget 
it), we have to live during it as well.” 
These various currents are not obviously the result of conscious borrowing and active 
discourse. The cross-references between them are surprisingly few. The Carnegie report is 
not referred to in Howarth; and neither the Carnegie report nor Howarth refer to the work of 
Toulmin or Williams; and MacKinnon is not referred to in Carnegie or Howarth. It seems that 
the twenty-first century academic zeitgeist rejects the traditional primacy of theory over 
practice and Law as Engineering can be best understood in this broader intellectual context. 
Chapter 2 is devoted to the question “What do lawyers do?” is excellent. It reviews a lot of 
research on legal services and is persuasive on the need to give a higher profile to 
transactional lawyers in accounts of legal professional practice. The material on legislative 
draftsmen is interesting and informative and this reader certainly profited from the attention 
given to the work of these specialists. The material on the work of City lawyers is also well 
assembled and structured. The transactional lawyer and the legislative draftsman are both 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
7 Graham Ferris and Nick Johnson, Practical Nous as the Aim of Legal Education? (2013) 19 International 
Journal of Clinical Legal Education at 271. Howarth in Law as Engineering notices rule entrepreneurship but 
does not emphasise its importance at p. 196. However, the role of the legislative draftsman is given great 
emphasis in the book. It seems Howarth retains a technocratic view of legal practice: see pp. 151-158 and p. 
167. However, he is clearly very concerned with the ethics of legal practice and pp. 168-169 suggests he thinks 
ethical lawyering can temper, minimise, or even avoid unethical practices. The section of the Nottingham Law 
Journal devoted to “Practical Applied Legal Theory” is an attempt to encourage thinking about the relationship 
between practice, real life, and theory. 
8 Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (2006) Routledge, Abingdon at pp. 116-117, first 
published (1985). 
seen as producing documents which are the form of the devices that lawyers design. This 
means that social interactions are rather downplayed: negotiation, team building and 
management, and oral communication fall into the background as necessary antecedents of 
the final documents. The textual bias may be due to a desire to downplay the oral aspects of 
the role, because the oral and situational has traditionally been emphasised in the lawyer as 
advocate paradigm that Howarth is trying to supplant. 
The chapter does have a rather partial focus on commercial private practice and legislative 
drafting. Howarth shows awareness of the relative neglect of lawyers who do not serve 
powerful institutions, whether public or private. However, he seems to assume transactional 
lawyers working for private clients do the same sort of thing as City lawyers at a less exulted 
level. He develops one example from private client work, specifically will drafting, to 
highlight key aspects the transactional lawyer’s role. The whole chapter is a very useful 
corrective for unreflective characterisations of legal services as being concerned with 
disputes and courts.  
The following chapter “Law as engineering” is also excellent. It gives a fascinating account 
of academic engineering. It is hard to disagree with Howarth’s judgment that the engineers 
have a far better articulated and differentiated account of the practice of engineering than 
academic lawyers have managed to produce of the work of transactional lawyers. The chapter 
goes on to compare the roles of the drafting lawyer to the engineer and the comparison is 
interesting and generates novel insights. Finally, the chapter allows for the possibility of 
allowing litigators into the engineering fold. Together these two chapters constitute sufficient 
reason to read this book. The similarities between law and engineering are powerfully 
delineated. The material assembled is instructive and excites intellectual curiosity and 
engagement. 
The fourth chapter “Implications (1) – Professional ethics” works less well. The central 
contention: that the ethics of transactional lawyers, those involved in non-contentious work, 
need far greater attention is surely correct. The criticism of assertions in non-contentious 
fields of ethical positions justified by systemic features of adversarial advocacy is well made. 
Identification of a problem with the effects of legal advice and services on third parties to the 
lawyer client relationship is sound. Thus, the chapter is valuable. However, the examples 
chosen to illustrate these problems do not work very well.9 The examples are chosen to link 
legal ethics to the banking crisis, and this renders the argument rather artificial. The systemic 
causes of the banking crisis were not driven by legal practices.10 It would have been better to 
use situations that have already been discussed in the literature on professional ethics.11 This 
                                                          
9 Linklaters’ advice letter on Repo 105s in the context of Lehman Brothers business, and the assembling of 
derivatives for Goldman Sachs that the bank shorted. 
10 See: Charles P. Kindleberger and Robert Z. ALiber, Manias, Panics and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises 
(2011) Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills. 
11 For example: William H. Simon, The Practice of Justice: A Theory of Lawyers’ Ethics (2000) Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge MA develops some pertinent cases that could have been discussed. The cause lawyer 
literature also offers illuminating discussion of the relationships between the personal ethics of the person 
who is a lawyer, the ethics of the lawyer as professional, and the ethics of the practice of the client. The 
treatment of the extensive and varied literature is disappointing. Finally, the problem of ethical action in the 
is because better examples are available in the literature, and the repeated examination of the 
same problem scenarios from different perspectives can produce a more generative and 
elaborated discourse: one might refer to the related literature developed around runaway 
trolleys in ethical discourse. Thus, novelty of presentation here was at the expense of the 
potential value of the discussion. However, as noted the questions raised are pertinent and 
important and the discussion of analogous engineering ethics is valuable. 
The fifth chapter “Implications (2) – Legal research and teaching” is a useful contribution to 
ongoing debates about the Law School. The assumption that lawyers do and should serve the 
powerful is evident once more, and there is no counter-balancing example from private client 
practice.12 Also, from a UK Law School perspective there is a neglect of those students who 
study law but do not go into practice.  
The differentiation between policy and law is also active. The distinction tends to introduce a 
division between purpose and technical implementation. It is an instrumentalist view of law 
that Howarth advances. He then superimposes a duty to have regard to the uses made of legal 
devices taken from ethical discourse in engineering. In effect he places role morality and 
public benefit in an uneasy and unresolved relationship of tension.13 He has identified 
problems with extending the role morality of the advocate to the transactional lawyer but has 
not given enough attention to the role morality of the transactional lawyer.  
The suggestion that rules are legal materials the way that engineering has materials and that 
research into rules is usefully analogous to research into metals and plastics is unpersuasive.14 
Rules are words, or social practices, or logical relations, or authority bestowing conventions, 
or plans of action amongst other things. If there is to be a science of materials then the subject 
matter would have to be: the speech act or written equivalent (the operative words of a deed); 
the interpretative community; community norms of action (where community is defined by 
relationship or practice e.g. those people and organisations who work in the construction 
industry). The focus on the text that was present earlier returns and it is not just the advocate 
it displaces: it is the social situation that is obscured. If this is correct then Howarth’s attempt 
to demarcate the social sciences and academic law also breaks down. The argument that 
doctrinal law serves by providing construction materials seems to be a return to a rather 
abstract naïve view of law. Practice is about what works, and sometimes rules work in 
practice. The movement from this to: all that is important for practice is clear rules; seems 
illegitimate. Construction of contracts and dispositions is uncertain in practice because the 
text, the rules or words, are not autonomous of communities of practice as Howarth 
recognises elsewhere.15 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
face of pressure is clearly identified as an important issue in the context of the Challenger disaster, but no 
attention is given to the literature on moral courage and efficacy e.g. Mary C. Gentile, Giving Voice to Values: 
How to Speak Your Mind When You Know What’s Right (2012) Yale University Press, New Haven.  
12 David Howarth, Law as Engineering (2013) Edwin Elgar Cheltenham at pp. 151-158. 
13 David Howarth, Law as Engineering (2013) Edwin Elgar Cheltenham at 168 and pp. 178 – 181. 
14 David Howarth, Law as Engineering (2013) Edwin Elgar Cheltenham at 159 – 160. 
15 David Howarth, Law as Engineering (2013) Edwin Elgar Cheltenham at p. 90. 
The fifth chapter is thus provocative and intriguing but not wholly successful in its own 
terms. Perhaps the sheer bravado of attempting a reformist account of the entire activity of 
the academic legal community in a single chapter is intended to imply that the treatment is 
tentative and exploratory, and an invitation to debate, rather than the final word on the subject 
from the author. It certainly kept this reader engaged, although ultimately it was 
unpersuasive. 
Finally, Howarth’s conclusion deals with “objections” to the idea of law as engineering and 
highlights the promised benefits of the approach. It keeps up the clear style but it suffers from 
the vice of setting up weaker positions to overcome than could be established. The benefits it 
identifies are also a little speculative.  
In conclusion this book is entertaining, informative, engaging, and provocative. It is well 
written and referenced, the index is good and useful, the physical book feels and looks good. 
If seen as an attempt to reformulate how law and lawyers are seen by themselves and others, 
and how law is taught and researched, then I very much doubt it will succeed. However, if 
viewed as one work in a current that reflects a zeitgeist that rejects genuflection to systemic 
theorising in the legal academy then it is a useful and helpful contribution to the discourse. 
The book places legal practice in the field of making, and depicts legal practice as primarily 
about making useful devices. It introduces to a legal audience an academic and practical 
discipline that does have real similarities with law. It thus allows fruitful generalisation and 
creative appropriation of concepts from engineering. It is certainly worth reading and 
reflecting upon. 
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